November 2025 was not an anomaly. The capture and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba, the mass abduction of 303 students from St. Mary’s School in Papiri, and the brazen seizure of 38 worshippers during a live service in Kwara were not isolated tragedies. They were the inevitable result of a 15-year trajectory that has systematically transformed a sovereign state into a high-functioning kidnapping economy.
Nigeria’s collapse is not a sudden event; it is a transition. Here is the blueprint of that failure.
I. The Economic Model: High Volume, Low Resistance
Between July 2024 and June 2025, Nigeria recorded 4,722 kidnappings in nearly 1,000 separate incidents. While the ₦48 billion demanded in ransoms dwarfs the ₦2.57 billion actually paid, the 5.35% collection rate is misleading. In a “soft collapse” economy, ₦2.57 billion (~$1.6 million) is more than enough to fund a standing army of insurgents.
The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) presents an even darker reality: household surveys suggest as many as 2.23 million kidnapping incidents annually. This massive gap reveals a “ghost economy” where families negotiate in silence, bypass state authorities, and treat ransom as a recurring tax on survival.
The Three-Tier Hierarchy
This is not disorganized crime; it is a corporate structure:
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Foot Soldiers: Guard captives in forest camps; receive the smallest share.
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Mid-level Commanders: Negotiate with families and handle logistics.
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Bandit Kingpins: Control vast territories and reinvest profits into military-grade hardware.
As the Naira depreciated between 2022 and 2025, kidnappers adapted by tripling their Naira demands to maintain a stable USD value—a feedback loop that drains the middle class while keeping the insurgency liquid.
II. The Supply Chain: From Libya to the Lakurawa Group
The weapons fueling this crisis trace back to the 2011 fall of Libya. Looted arsenals of AK-47s, PKM machine guns, and anti-aircraft weapons flowed south through the Sahel.
The 2023 military coup in Niger further destabilized the 1,500km border, effectively ending joint patrols. This opened a “superhighway” for the Lakurawa group, an Al-Qaeda-linked insurgent force that has successfully bridged the gap between Sahelian jihadists and Nigerian bandits. Profit and ideology now reinforce each other: bandits provide the manpower, while jihadists provide the tactical intelligence and heavier ordinance.
The Corruption Component: In September 2025, reports from the Alliance of Sahel States suggested that certain Nigerian political and military elites are actively involved in arms trafficking. This explains why bandit groups remain well-supplied despite a ₦4.91 trillion (roughly $10 billion) defense budget.
III. Institutional Failure: The Collapse of State Function
The execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba in November 2025 serves as a case study in state paralysis. Despite having his GPS coordinates and a video confirming he was alive post-ambush, the military failed to coordinate a rescue before ISWAP fighters relocated and killed him.
This highlights a three-fold breakdown:
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Intelligence Failure: Known ISWAP territories were not properly monitored.
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Coordination Failure: Poor air-to-ground communication delayed rapid response.
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Security Breach: The ability of terrorists to move high-value targets minutes before rescue suggests deep infiltration by informants.
The Policy of Capitulation
When 303 students were taken from St. Mary’s School, the government’s response was not to bolster security but to blame the school for staying open. Closing 589 schools across the North is not a strategy; it is a surrender. By shifting the burden of security onto citizens and administrators, the state has effectively abdicated its constitutional duty.
IV. The Human and Global Toll
The consequences are now visible in the soil and the markets:
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Agriculture: 30 million Nigerians faced acute food insecurity in 2025 because farmers must pay “protection taxes” to bandits to access their fields.
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Displacement: Over 2 million people are displaced, transforming productive citizens into aid-dependent refugees.
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Global Standing: Nigeria currently ranks 6th on the Global Terrorism Index—worse than Afghanistan. On the Global Peace Index, it sits at 147th, grouped with war-torn nations like Somalia and Iraq.
Conclusion: The Road to 2026
Nigeria is currently in a state of “soft collapse.” The institutions exist on paper, and the lights stay on in Abuja, but the state has lost the monopoly on violence in the peripheral regions.
Unless there is a fundamental dismantling of the corruption networks within the security procurement process and a proactive re-securing of the borders, the trajectory points toward a total state failure. As of late December 2025, while some students have been released, the underlying machinery of the kidnapping economy remains untouched, waiting for the next “inevitable” week in November.